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Abstract 
The improvement of pastoral livelihoods in the context of a highly uncertain economic and 
climatic future implies a double need for conserving livestock biodiversity and reaching 
productivity gains. In situ conservation through participative genetic improvement programs 
is a tool of choice for these sustainable development pursuits. In this regard, breeding goals 
chosen by pastoralist breeders can be classified in two broad categories : productivity-seeking 
or risk-alleviating. The latter aim was an important motive for the constitution of the present 
indigenous breeds while the former is often a rationale for their neglect. Understanding the 
balance can help finding the way to sustainable biodiversity management. Being the basis of 
pastoral livelihood systems, livestock shoulders many roles, among which that of savings may 
be considered central. Credit facilities lacking in these remote areas, breeders would thus sell 
part of their productive capital to invest in its improvement. The present model consists in a 
theoretical inquiry for the possible consequence of this polyvalence of livestock, productive 
capital and mobilizable saving, on the choice between the two above-mentioned breeding 
aims under liquidity constraint. A major outcome of the proposed model is the existence of a 
threshold herd size effect on investment in risk-control. This effect does not bear on 
investment in productivity and is no longer observed if credit constraint is relaxed. This 
threshold is thus proposed to entail the presence of an “erosion trap” for biodiversity and 
further recalls the difficulty to design a breeding program for a group of breeders with very 
diverse endowments. As a result, appropriate credit programs should be considered as an 
important key to adoption of breeding schemes for in situ conservation, and thus both their 
efficiency and viability. 
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Introduction 
Pastoral systems cradled and harbor a wealth of animal breeds, showing diverse and possibly 
precious adaptive features. This tremendous diversity presently comes under threat through 
social upheavals, erosion of indigenous institutions and knowledge, environmental crises as 
well as continuous politic and economic pressure for sedentarization (Köhler-Rollefson, 1997; 
Goe and Stranzinger, 2002; Tisdell, 2003; Homann et al., 2008). Facing this rapid erosion of 
biodiversity, the major grounds for genetic diversity conservation programs are the option 
value, i.e. the possible need for some genetic attributes to face future environmental or 
economic challenges, and the existence value, principally drawn from cultural and leisure use 
value (Roosen et al., 2005). This widely spread viewpoint seems to imply a lack of present 
productive value for these breeds, their neglect then resulting from some inadequacy to their 
economic environment (Mendelsohn, 2003). Nevertheless, given the quasi-public good nature 
of livestock genetics, other mechanisms might come into play, explaining diversity loss where 
it was, however, useful, at least for part of the social groups involved. Indeed, marginal costs 
of producing an animal of a certain improved breed is quasi-zero and genetic progress is 
characterized by strong positive externalities, extensive herding systems leading to non- 
excludability from its consumption. Moreover, genetic determinism of resilience to several 
animal diseases implies that epidemiological positive spillovers also result from a selective 
breeding directed towards the improvement of such attributes. One might thus expect free-
riding problem in genetic improvement/management under pastoral conditions that should 
account for part of the genetic erosion through the introduction of more productive and less 
resilient exotic breeds. As a matter of fact, genetic innovation has been previously spurred in 
an effective way and past activities of pastoral people has delivered the present array of 
highly adapted breeds, the poor productive performances of which are to ascribe as a rule of 
thumb to the general risk control objective of the breeders. Genetic improvement, through 
participative selection processes, appears as the most promising way of coping both with the 
urgent need for promotion of genetic diversity and with the need for progress in societies that 
should benefit from productivity gains in the context of an increasing pressure on pastoral 
resources. In situ conservation of indigenous breeds and their conjoint improvement entails 
the thorough consideration of breeding goals of pastoral herders. From an economic point of 
view, it can be considered that those objectives are to classify in two general categories: 
individual productivity and risk management. Obviously, the attitude of the livestock owners 
towards risk will govern this choice. The question of interest is here that of a possible effect 
of herd size in that respect. Indeed, a typical feature of livestock economics is the dual nature 
of animals as commercial and capital goods, which proved to have appreciable impacts on 
price elasticity in some production systems (Jarvis, 1974). In addition, in traditional pastoral 
societies, the animals does not only constitute a productive asset but is also a major form of 
savings, that can be mobilized when facing cash needs in the context of a liquidity constraint 
in such marginalized areas. Thus, the original postulate of this model is that the breeder, to 
join or impulse any improvement program (either through selective or cross-breeding), will 
incur costs that will be covered by liquidation of part of its capital. According to this 
postulate, herd size is expected to have some influence on the basic choice between 




Empirical facts: indigenous breeding strategies 
Genetic orientation of their livestock towards productivity vs. risk management keeps a 
pivotal role in the general strategy of pastoral herders coping with a harsh and highly variable 
environment. Several illustrations of these strategies are found in the literature. In Rajasthan, 
the Raika pastoralists are so reported to keep two breeds of sheep, the Boti and the Bhagli, the 
first being more resilient while the latter is more productive. When a bad year is expected, 
breeders cross their ewes with Boti rams to get stronger products while they prefer crossing 
their ewes with Baghli rams when good years are foreseen (Anderson and Centonze, 2007). In 
the Eritrea, the Beni Amer pastoralists used to adopt a breeding strategy directed towards milk 
production and docility, keeping relatively small production units of 60 to 100 animals. This 
strategy is clearly at odds with the strategy adopted in other regions of semi-arid Africa where 
resilience and high mobility (through the use of camels) or wilder behavior and defensive 
long-horned zebu cattle are favored, as well as larger herds (Dinucci and Fre, 2003). Good 
pastures and security conditions are expected to account for such a strategy. Indeed, facing a 
rise in insecurity due to civil strife, the increase in cattle raiders, a deterioration of the climatic 
conditions and agricultural encroachment, the Beni Amer pastoralists reconsidered their 
strategy, introducing the communal grazing (aggregating smallest herds) and turning their 
genetic management towards wilder animals by cross-breeding with the Sudanese Dohein 
breed (Wilson, 2009). A third example can be found in Southern Ethiopia where the Borana 
cattle pastoralists also include genetic management as part of their strategy to cope with 
changing environment and pauperization (Homann et al., 2008). Interestingly, two cases can 
be distinguished according to the endowment of the breeders. The small herds of poorly 
endowed breeders do not allow the practice of mobility. These breeders are therefore forced 
to adopt a strategy of sedentary land use, breeding their stock towards smaller framed cattle in 
conjunction with small ruminants. Better endowed breeder may afford the higher mobility 
needed to cope with encroachment through the adoption of camels. Diversification is thus 
common to both strategies but orientations are clearly divergent. 
The model 
Assumptions and general model 
A single breeder (i) has to choose between two strategies, productivity per head (ci) and 
adaptation (ai), understood as cash investments in livestock improvement.  
 
The adaptation strategy allows the reduction of risk level while productivity is modeled as a 
risk-increasing strategy. Rationale for this choice is partly biological as productivity traits can 
be considered to be negatively correlated with adaptive traits or as indigenous livestock is out-
crossed to exotic breeds lacking an history of selection against local constraints. Productivity 
moreover entails economic risk because of an increased dependence on external inputs. 
The utility function of the breeder consists of a product of the mean individual value of the 
animals (y, related to productivity) and the number of them. This herd size is the variable told 
to be of interest in the present model under liquidity constraint. The breeder is thus assigned a 
number n0 at the beginning of the period, when its choice takes place. Given the liquidity 
constraint, strategy Si is financed through the sale of a number vi of animals at price P. The 
number of animals included in the utility function (n) is modeled as the number of surviving 
animals at the end of the period (nt+1), drawn according to the binomial distribution Bin(nt,p), 
with nt = n0 −vi and p the probability of survival. Risk management is thus inserted in the 
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model by considering p as a function of the strategy Si. The herder maximizes expected utility 
E(U). 
The attitude of the herder towards risk, as proposed through this model, might be interpreted 
as an infinite aversion. This formal proposition is grounded in sociological literature 
describing the so-called "high reliability hypothesis" (Roe et al., 1998). This hypothesis 
suggests that the behavior of pastoralists does not consist in coping with an exogenous risk 
but rather in a conscious control of the probability of loosing animals kept in very large herds 
for social status reasons. The herders are thus expected to minimize an endogenous risk as 
would do the manager of a nuclear plant, according to the original authors’ metaphor. 
Although these authors oppose high reliability to risk aversion from a sociological point of 
view, the mathematical form given here to their high reliability hypothesis does not stray from 
the economic definition of risk aversion. The use of a binomial distribution to model survival 
implies that the risk affecting livestock is here to consider as perfectly uncorrelated between 
animals. The reality symbolized is therefore the risk of theft, aggression by predators, non-
epizootic diseases, inability to efficiently feed on available resources and inadequacy of 
animal’s conformation regarding mobility, the latter strategy being a more general one 
adopted by herders to control covariant risks as drought and epizootics. 
 
Finally, the general optimization problem may be written 
 
Model specification 
Two functional forms had to be chosen to develop the general model. First, individual value 
of the animals was given the form of a classic Cobb-Douglas function. The values y, ai and ci 
being expressed in monetary terms, the exponents of this function thus correspond to the 
global return on investments in genetic improvement oriented towards adaptation or 
productivity, respectively. A gain regarding efficiency of the animal selection process, market 
organization for the delivery of livestock services necessary for maintenance of productive 
crossbred stock or the higher valuation on markets of the targeted characteristics can all be 
understood as factors increasing those exponents. For the sake of mathematical simplicity and 
to better underline forces at play in the process of erosion of livestock biodiversity, solely the 
strategy of productivity has been considered as truly valorized on markets. The probability of 
survival (p) has been modeled as an inverse logit function. The exponential terms were 
considered as simple linear combinations of the strategy variables, ai and ci, and herd size 






α0 general security level (a high value means a low risk level) 
α1 contribution of investments in adaptive traits to risk alleviation (> 0) 
α2 contribution of investments in productive traits to risk amplification (< 0) 
α3 technical factors accounting for the risk increase due to greater herd sizes (< 0) 
A0 basic value of an animal on the market 
β1 contribution of investments in adaptive traits to market value of animals (= 0) 
β2 contribution of investments in productive traits to market value of animals (> 0) 
n0 available herd size before investment in ai and ci 
Table 1: Meaning of parameters used in functional forms for the animal value y and probability of 
survival p. 
 
Expected utility thus adopts the following form. 
 
Optimization 
The first order conditions for maximization of E(U) lead to the following expressions. 
 
As we consider solely the case where β1 is 0 and by noting  
(α1 − (α3/p)) = γ1 and (α2 − (α3/p))= γ2 , 
from (1) and (2), we obtain 
 
The linear equation here above can be expressed as follows: after withdrawal of the amount 
invested in risk mitigation, wealth stored in the herd is allocated to productivity according to a 
coefficient θ, that is a function of risk parameters α1, α2, α3, price P and efficiency of ci in 
increasing productivity. From (3) and (1), we obtain 
 
It can be sought for behavior of the model for extreme values of ai and ci. In this respect, a 
lack of investment in ai may occur under conditions of liquidity constraint as shown by the 
following expression (in which nsa stands for threshold herd size for investment in ai). 
 
Conversely, a zero value of ci would imply that ai = n0P, which is not achievable except under 




Liquidity constraint was relaxed by assuming an access to credit for amounts that can be 
guaranteed by total herd size. In this way, the wealth effect on investment is not abolished and 
the modification of the general model more specifically addresses the impact of the need for 
selling animals from the herd to invest in its improvement. Costless access to credit is 
assumed so that the herder maximizing its expected utility through investment in ai and ci will 
make use of all the available credit. Thus, we consider nt = n0 = ai +ci. The expected P utility 
function thus becomes 
 
And maximization program delivers the following expression. 
 
Cases where ai or ci would be zero would imply 
 
As n0 cannot take negative values, (α1 + (α3/P)) should then be negative. However, the latter 
proposition is not expected to occur if parameters settings have to consider as possible the 
alleviation of risk due to herd size (α3) through improvement of the animal capital (α1). Quite 
intuitively, it can be understood from those equations that no situation where ai or ci is zero 
can occur if access to credit is allowed. 
 
Herd size threshold 
As a threshold for investment in risk control has been detected in conditions of liquidity 
constraint, it might be of interest to consider under the present model the impact of different 
parameters on this threshold. From the implicit function describing threshold evolution (equ. 
4), effect on nsa of a decrease of the overall security level (α0, might correspond to a climate 
felt by herders to be more and more erratic or for civil strife) and of an increase of risk due to 
herd size (|α3|, accounting for diverse real situations as an increase in thefts). 
 
As already exposed, γ1 is expected to be positive while γ2 is always negative by definition. 
The composed parameter θ, which represents the opportunity for herders to invest in 
individual animal productivity is thus always positive. Both expressions so adopt positive 






The present model aimed at a theoretic investigation of the impact of liquidity constraint on a 
breeder’s choice between productive and risk-controlling traits in its herd. Indeed, it could be 
observed in the literature that animal genetic resources were an important component of 
strategies adopted to face environmental, sociological and economical challenges. 
Considering the whole livestock-based livelihood system and the complex strategies 
implemented, animal genetics might even be conceived as central to those as it involves a 
modification in the nature of the capital good on which production is founded. Thus, the 
context of this theoretic enquiry was that of the domestic biodiversity erosion and the need for 
conservation programs to include improvement aspects in accordance with breeders’ 
objectives. However, no specific element of the model does restrict its implication to the 
study of the genetic make-up of an extensive herd. Therefore, any strategy that can be 
classified as productivity- and risk-increasing or as risk-alleviating but productivity-neutral 
can be integrated in this framework. In this context of animal genetic resources management 
and improvement, the point of interest addressed through this model was the impact of 
liquidity constraint, i.e. the need for the breeder to sell part of its capital to meet improvement 
objectives, on the direction of the strategy adopted, classified regarding its effect on 
productivity and risk-control. More specifically, the question of the herd size effect, and thus 
the wealth of the breeder, was tackled through this model. 
A central outcome of this model is the existence of a threshold effect of herd size on 
investment in risk-alleviating traits under liquidity constraint that is not observed when access 
to credit is allowed and that does not affect strategy regarding productivity. Where thresholds 
are, poverty traps are expected to occur. Poverty traps are an important feature of livestock- 
based livelihood systems, e.g. linked to threshold effects in herd reproduction (Lybbert et al., 
2004). Events that force the breeder below such a threshold herd size dramatically affect its 
future by jeopardizing the accumulation process or numerical productivity. It is here 
suggested that a similar poverty trap exists regarding incentives for risk control. Below a 
certain level of endowment, the breeder would be lead to neglect risk-alleviation by the need 
for capital liquidation to meet the incurred costs. The latter observation is rendered all the 
more notable by the extreme form of risk aversion that is considered in this model. 
As exposed among the empirical facts retrieved from literature, access to mobility is a critical 
parameter in the determination of a breeding strategy in evolving pastoral systems (choice of 
species, breeds and breeding traits) (Dinucci and Fre, 2003; Homann et al., 2008). Mobility 
was itself told to be allowed by sufficient endowment of the breeder to afford the investment 
in expensive genetic resources as camels (Homann et al., 2008). The same study describes 
that breeders lacking access to mobility adopted an "intensification" strategy, rather resulting 
in pauperization given defective access to production factors and poverty traps inherent to 
livestock rearing. Human and environmental harm that results from this process can be 
viewed under the present framework as directly linked to the liquidity constraint that such 
breeders have to face. 
As regards livestock biodiversity concerns, because of the overlap between the different 
stylized dualities at play (selection vs. cross-breeding, indigenous vs. exotic breeds and 
productivity vs. risk-alleviation), the suggested poverty trap might be translated to an 
« erosion trap ». Rather than focusing on the role of a priority given to productivity motives 
for local breeds neglect, it could thus be understood that credit constraint impedes investment 
in an asymmetrical way, skewing breeder’s choice towards productivity and against 
adaptation. 
Quite tautologically, participative genetic improvement programs cannot overlook breeders 
objectives that constitute the heart of their legitimacy, usefulness, efficiency and viability. In 
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this regard, breeding traits are valued according to different methods, including choice 
experiments that allow valuation of traits in the absence of markets for them. The breeders 
objectives as handled in this model refer to the more general consequence of those traits and 
do not lend themselves to practical application. This theoretical approach rather highlights the 
upstream role of access to credit in the value attributed to traits according to their risk- 
alleviating or productivity-increasing nature. It moreover calls attention to the difficulty of 
integrating breeders with very different endowments in a same improvement program and the 
possible role for appropriate credit facilities in this prospect. 
Finally, the case of liquidity constraint in extensive livestock keeping in developing countries 
might be rephrased as a case of liquidity constraint in a situation where a same asset embodies 
the savings of an agent, the main source of utility to him and the capital in the improvement 
of which he may invest. Addressing this quite specific case allowed the identification of a 
potentially important factor of erosion of animal genetic resources, that should be added to 
those enumerated in the introduction. 
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